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Re: Braithwaite v . West Valley City 
Supreme Court Case No. 900209 
Citation of Supplemental Authority 
Dear Mr, Butler: 
In accordance with Rule 24(0), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
defendant-respondent, West Valley City Corporation, br ings to the Court fs 
attention the following supplemental authorities: 
1. Duncan v . Union Pacific Railroad Company and the State of Utah, 
Supreme Court No 900233, decided by the Utah Supreme Court on April 6, 1992. 
That case deals with the issue of whether the governmental entity fs activities 
in question are "governmental" and "discretionary functions" for which immunity 
is retained under the Governmental Immunity Act. That case relates to the 
arguments set forth in Respondents Brief at Point II. 
2 Lamarr v . Utah State Department of Transportation and Salt Lake 
City, Utah Court of Appeals No 910600-CA, decided March 26, 1992, and reported 
at 183 UAR 53. That case found that the city owed no duty to the plaintiff to 
construct a sidewalk, and relates generally to the argument found at Point I of 
Respondents Brief. 
Please advise if counsel can be of any further assistance to the Court. 
ALL:mc 
Enclosures: Cases 
cc: M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
Very truly yours , 
ALLAN/L L ^ S O N 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Lewis Duncan, individually and No. 900233 
as personal representative of 
the Estate of Patrick Duncan, F I L E D 
deceased, et al., April 6, 1992 
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
a corporation; State of Utah; 
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 
through 100, inclusive, 
Defendants and Respondents. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Attorneys: Michael A. Katz, Salt Lake City, for Lewis Duncan 
and Patrick Duncan 
J. Clare Williams, Larry A. Gantenbein, Salt Lake 
City, for Union Pacific Railroad and Paul Kleinman 
Stephen J. Sorenson, Craig L. Barlow, Allan L. 
Larson, Anne Swensen, Salt Lake City, for State of 
Utah 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
HQWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals* 
decision which affirmed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of all defendants. Duncan v. Union Pacific 
R.R., 790 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
A complete statement of the facts is contained in the 
court of appeals' opinion, and we will here briefly restate 
the most significant of them. On April 9, 1983, at about 8:50 
p.m., an automobile driven by Patrick Duncan containing three 
passengers was struck by a Union Pacific freight train. All 
four persons in Duncan's car were killed. The accident 
occurred in rural Tooele County on Droubay Road, which is 
essentially a straight two-lane road running north and south 
through the county. The rails traverse Droubay Road at an 
angle of slightly over 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees 
on the south. The Duncan car approached the crossing from the 
south at the oblique angle of 136 degrees. Three warning 
signs were in place at the time of the accident: a railroad 
advance warning sign (a circular yellow sign with a large 
black X and R) located 305 feet from the crossing, and two on 
either side of the road (white cross-bars with "railroad 
crossing" printed in black letters) located 19 feet from the 
crossing. No active warning device, such as flashing lights 
or an automatic gate, was in place. However, nothing 
obstructed a motorist's view of the tracks for several 
thousand feet. 
Plaintiffs brought this wrongful death action on 
behalf of the four occupants. The trial court awarded summary 
judgment to Union Pacific and its engineer, Paul Kleinman, on 
the ground that as a matter of law, they were not negligent 
and to the State of Utah on the ground of governmental 
immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. 
DUTY OF UNION PACIFIC 
Plaintiffs assail the court of appeals' decision in 
favor of Union Pacific on the basis that the court did not 
apply the proper standard of care to the railroad to protect 
highway motorists crossing its tracks. Plaintiffs concede 
that the State, through its Department of Transportation 
(UDOT), not Union Pacific, has the authority to determine at 
which crossings automatic warning lights and gates shall be 
installed and maintained under Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-14 to 
-15.1. However, plaintiffs argue that UDOT's responsibility 
under the statute should not relieve Union Pacific from the 
duty to petition and urge UDOT to upgrade the adequacy of the 
warning signs at dangerous crossings because it is Union 
Pacific who is or should be aware of the danger. Plaintiffs 
further suggest that in extreme cases a railroad should have 
the duty to bring suit to compel UDOT to do so. 
The court of appeals properly observed that under our 
case law a railroad cannot be held liable for crossing 
conditions unless the crossing is "more than ordinarily 
hazardous." Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 790 P.2d at 598 
(citing Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 
P.2d 738 (1971); English v. Southern Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407, 
45 P. 47 (1896)). The court of appeals further explained: 
In the case of railroad crossings, the 
costs of eliminating the hazard, such as by 
installing overpasses at all railroad 
crossings, including rural ones, does not 
warrant a duty of care so rigorous that 
simply having a railroad cross a street is 
tortious. Rather, for a railroad to be 
liable for a crossing mishap, there must be 
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something about the railroad's right of way 
that creates a hazard to motorists greater 
than the hazard presented by the simple 
fact that the railroad and the street 
intersect* 
Duncan, 790 P.2d at 599. In the instant case, the trial court 
found that the crossing was not -more than ordinarily 
hazardous" because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even 
suggest, what more Union Pacific could have done to make this 
crossing safer, short of installing automatic warning lights 
and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its 
responsibility. 
In English v. Southern Pacific Co., we pointed out 
that a crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily 
hazardous if it was in a thickly populated portion of a city; 
if the view of the tracks was obstructed because of the 
railroad itself or because of natural objects; if the crossing 
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains 
could not be heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at 
the crossing were rendered inadequate to warn the public of 
the danger of an approaching train. English, 13 Utah at 
419-20, 45 P. at 50. Recently our court of appeals found a 
crossing more than ordinarily hazardous and held the railroad 
liable for a crossing accident because it had allowed wild 
vegetation on the right-of-way to obscure the vision of 
oncoming trains from approaching motorists. Gleave v. Denver 
& Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The cost of removing the vegetation was minimal compared to 
the public benefit of being able to see an approaching train. 
Plaintiffs' contention that Union Pacific should have 
a duty to petition, urge, and even bring suit against UDOT to 
compel it to improve the adequacy of the warning devices at a 
crossing is unavailing. Active warning devices are funded 90 
percent from federal funds and 10 percent from the entity with 
jurisdiction over the highway in question. Federal funding is 
generally available only for eight to ten projects in Utah 
each year. UDOT has developed and uses a hazard index rating 
approved by the Federal Highway Administration as one means of 
determining the priority of crossings for upgrading the 
adequacy of warning devices presently in place. UDOT's team, 
with the railroad and local government representatives, makes 
on-site inspections of crossings throughout the state, using 
the hazard index. Priorities are then established, based on 
the degree of hazard found at the crossings surveyed. In view 
of this careful and orderly approach to the safety problem at 
crossings, we decline to impose a duty on railroads to 
circumvent that process by petitioning, urging, or bringing 
suit against UDOT to change the order of its prioritizations. 
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On Utah's roads and highways, there are more than 
1,000 railroad crossings which lack active warning devices. 
Requiring a railroad to petition UDOT in order to improve the 
signage at one crossing without considering whether a greater 
hazard exists at other crossings would make little sense. The 
Droubay Road crossing had been inspected by UDOT and assigned 
a priority rating. Other crossings inspected at that time 
were given a higher priority rating because the potential 
hazard was thought to be greater than that of the Droubay 
crossing. The public is better served by a system such as 
that devised by UDOT, which takes into consideration all the 
crossings in Utah. We conclude that the court of appeals did 
not err in affirming the summary judgment in favor of Union 
Pacific. 
IMMUNITY OF THE STATE 
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment 
granted in favor of the State under the authority of its 
earlier decision in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That case held 
that UDOT was immune from suit in determining the type of 
warning devices which should be required at railroad 
crossings. The determination of UDOT was held to be the 
exercise of a discretionary function for which immunity has 
been reserved by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a). The court, 
in turn, relied upon our decision in Velasquez v. Union 
Pacific Railroad, 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), where we 
held that the alleged failure of the public service commission 
(which at that time had the responsibility now reposed in 
UDOT) to require more adequate warning devices at a railroad 
crossing involved the exercise of a discretionary function for 
which immunity had not been waived, Gleave, 749 P.2d at 669. 
In Velasquez, we emphasized the statutory directive to the 
public service commission, which was feo prescribe the 
installation of "appropriate" safety or other devices, and 
held that this language indicated a legislative intent to 
confer discretion on the commission in discharging that 
statutory duty. 24 Utah 2d at 219, 469 P.2d at 6. 
Plaintiffs now contend that Velasquez v. Union 
Pacific should be overruled because our later decision in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), 
narrowed governmental immunity. Plaintiffs urge that UDOT's 
decision to defer any improvement in the warning device at the 
Droubay Road crossing was an operational rather than a 
discretionary decision and that Velasquez has been overruled 
sub silentio by three later decisions of this court. We will 
consider these contentions in order. 
Our decision in Standiford v. Salt Lake City did not 
in any way impinge upon our prior decision in Velasquez. In 
Standiford, we clarified and narrowed the type of activities 
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carried on by governmental entities which could properly be 
termed "governmental functions." In the instant case, 
plaintiffs do not contend that UDOT's duty to determine the 
type of warning devices to be placed at a particular crossing 
is not a governmental function. Standiford did not deal with 
the further issue of whether, in the exercise of a 
governmental function, a particular duty is discretionary or 
operational. 
Plaintiffs* contention that UDOT's decision to defer 
improving the adequacy of warning devices at a crossing is an 
operational decision and not a discretionary one must fail. 
As pointed out earlier in this opinion, UDOT utilizes a 
surveillance team to evaluate the level of the hazards to 
motorists at hundreds of crossings where active warning 
devices are not in place. This team assigns priorities to 
those crossings where the greatest hazards exist. UDOT then 
upgrades the warning devices at those crossings with the 
highest priority until the limited available funds have been 
exhausted. Crossings with a lower priority must await 
financing for another year. 
Furthermore, UDOT's operation meets the four-step 
test for a discretionary function outlined in Little v. Utah 
State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 
1983). First, a basic governmental objective is involved—the 
promotion of public safety at railroad crossings. Second, the 
evaluation of crossings and the assigning of priorities for 
upgrading the adequacy of warning devices now in place are 
essential to the improvement of public safety. Third, UDOT 
exercises "basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise" in 
utilizing a surveillance team to weigh the degree of hazard at 
the crossings it inspects and to subsequently assign 
priorities to those crossings where the greatest hazard 
exists. Fourth, UDOT has the necessary statutory authority to 
determine which crossings are most hazardous and most 
deserving of the limited funds available for active warning 
devices. 
The duties of UDOT are not unlike those of the 
defendants in Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 784 
P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), who had the responsibility to determine 
the design, capacity, and construction of a drainage system to 
carry away flood waters. In that case, we pointed out: 
Decisions made by defendants before the 
flood regarding the design, capacity, and 
construction of their flood control systems 
are the result of serious and extensive 
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise 
in numerous areas of concern. These areas 
would include geological, environmental, 
financial, and urban planning and 
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developmental concerns, and financial 
concerns, just to name a few. 
Id. at 463. We reaffirm our holding in Velasquez that the 
duties imposed upon UDOT in these particulars are truly 
discretionary functions and are therefore protected by 
governmental immunity. 
Our decisions in Bigelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1980), Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1982), and Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985), 
have not eroded our holding in Velasquez. In Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, a similar contention 
was made but rejected by the court of appeals. 749 P.2d at 
669. In Bigelow v. Inoersoll, two automobiles collided at a 
highway intersection due to an improperly synchronized 
traffic light which allowed the plaintiffs to make a left 
turn in front of an oncoming vehicle which also had a green 
light. 618 P.2d at 53. Obviously, there was a malfunction 
which was completely unintended and unanticipated and did not 
result from the exercise of anyone's judgment. In Bowen v. 
Riverton City, two automobiles collided at an intersection 
because a stop sign had either fallen down or been knocked 
down. We held that Riverton City had a nondelegable duty to 
maintain its traffic signals in a reasonably safe, visible, 
and working condition. 656 P.2d at 437. We remanded the 
case for a factual determination of whether Riverton City was 
negligent in not responding sooner to notice it had received 
that the sign was down, since an earlier response might have 
prevented the accident. Again, in that case Riverton City 
did not contend that it had any discretion as to whether the 
stop sign should be promptly replaced. The city's duty was 
clear, and the only question was whether it responded 
reasonably once it had notice of the hazard. In Richards v. 
Leavitt. suit was brought against a city for negligently 
allowing trees, shrubs, and other growth to obscure the 
vision of motorists at an intersection and negligently 
failing to maintain a stop sign. 716 P.2d at 277. Our 
holding in a per curiam decision was simply that the 
maintenance of traffic control devices on streets is a 
governmental function and the presentation of a timely notice 
of claim under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 was mandatory. 716 
P.2d at 279. We did not have occasion to reach the question 
of what constitutes a discretionary function. 
We find no error in the court of appeals' opinion 
and sustain its affirmance of the trial court's judgment. 
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WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman/ Justice 
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting) 
The Court holds that Union Pacific has no duty to 
upgrade the safety devices at a railroad crossing where four 
people were killed. The majority overturns 100 years of Utah 
case law holding railroads to a duty of care with respect to 
crossings without explanation or the slightest acknowledgment 
of its existence. The Court attempts to justify its 
extraordinary theory that a railroad has no duty to install 
adequate warning devices at dangerous crossings on the ground 
that the authority to require the upgrading of warning 
devices rests solely with the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT"). The Court also holds UDOT immune 
from suit. In addition, even though UDOT can require 
railroads to upgrade warning signs at unsafe crossings 
without an expenditure of state money, the Court holds that 
because UDOT lacks sufficient federal funding to upgrade 
safety devices at all railroad crossings on its list, UDOT 
owed no duty to plaintiffs to require more effective warning 
devices. I submit that summary judgment in favor of Union 
Pacific and UDOT was wrong, as a matter of law. Accordingly, 
I dissent. 
I 
I first address whether UDOT is immune from 
suit.1 The majority holds UDOT immune from suit on the 
1. We stated in Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989), 
that sound reason and simplicity require analyzing and applying 
negligence concepts before deciding issues of sovereign 
immunity because such an analysis avoids -having to make 
difficult decisions with respect to the difficult discretionary 
exception doctrine in sovereign immunity cases. Deciding an 
immunity question first may lead to unwarranted assumptions and 
confusion about undecided duty problems." Id. at 153. 
For the sake of organizational clarity, however, I first 
analyze the governmental immunity issue. But my departure here 
(Continued on page 8.) 
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ground that evaluating and assigning priorities for upgrading 
the adequacy of warning devices at railroad crossings is a 
discretionary function under Utah Code Ann, 
§ 63-30-10(1)(a). Although that proposition may be correct, 
the issue in this case is not UDOT's failure to make a 
decision to upgrade the warning signals at the Droubay 
crossing, but rather, UDOT's failure to implement the 
decision it had already made. The majority also ignores the 
fundamental mode of analysis for governmental immunity 
previously outlined by this Court and thus reaches its 
conclusion without following the necessary two-step test as 
set forth in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann, §§ 63-30-1 to -38. See Provo Citv Corp. v. State, 795 
P.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Utah 1990); &£&, fL*&^, Bennett v. Bow 
Valley Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 421-22 (Utah 1990); 
Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 
784 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Utah 1989); Metropolitan Finance Co. v. 
State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); see also 
Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 790 P.2d 595, 602-03 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
As Judge Jackson correctly stated in his concurring 
opinion below, before addressing whether § 63-30-10(1)(a) 
waives immunity, the court must first determine whether the 
activity in question is a governmental function under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983). Duncan, 790 P.2d at 602. 
Section 63-30-3, as it read at the time plaintiffs' cause of 
action arose,2 grants immunity for governmental 
(Footnote 1 continued.) 
from Ferree is not intended to undermine the policies just 
stated. Because I hold below that UDOT does have a duty to 
plaintiffs, the sovereign immunity issue must be addressed 
anyway. 
2. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 
(Utah 1980), we narrowly defined a governmental function as an 
activity so unique in nature "that it can only be performed by 
a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of 
governmental activity." In 1987, however, the Legislature 
enacted § 63-30-2(4)(a), which broadly defines a governmental 
function as 
any act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking of a governmental 
entity whether or not the act, failure to 
act, operation, function, or undertaking is 
characterized as governmental, proprietary, 
a core governmental function, unique to 
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, 
essential to or not essential to a 
government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or 
private persons. 
(Continued on page 9.) 
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functions exercised by governmental entities, subject to 
exceptions provided elsewhere in the Immunity Act. Thus, the 
threshold inquiry in a governmental immunity case is whether 
the activity complained of is a governmental function, for if 
it is not, there is no immunity- If, however, the activity 
is a governmental function, then the court must determine 
whether provisions of the Act have waived immunity. 
Remarkably, the majority fails to make this 
threshold inquiry, but instead assumes, without any analysis, 
that the exercise of UDOT's authority in this case is a 
governmental function. The majority attempts to justify its 
assumption by stating that "plaintiffs do not contend that 
UDOT's duty to determine the type of warning devices to be 
placed at a particular crossing is not a governmental 
function." This statement incorrectly implies that 
plaintiffs have failed to raise the issue. The issue before 
this Court is whether UDOT is immune from suit, and that 
issue can be resolved only after deciding the governmental 
function question. The problem is not that plaintiffs failed 
to raise the threshold issue, but rather, that the parties, 
the lower courts, and the majority have failed to apply the 
appropriate legal analysis.3 Moreover, plaintiffs' 
(Footnote 2 continued.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989). 
Although this section appears to overrule Standiford in 
that it makes any act by a governmental entity a governmental 
function, I have previously observed that the Utah 
Constitution imposes limits on the Legislature's authority to 
immunize all governmental actions from suit, particularly when 
those actions fall clearly outside traditional governmental 
activities. In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 
348, 372 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring), I stated that 
the test in Standiford identifies "whe*e the constitutional 
right of a person to have a remedy for personal injury begins 
under Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution as 
against a governmental agency, and where the governmental 
right to immunity from such lawsuits stops." However, the 
question of the scope of the State's authority to immunize its 
own nongovernmental activities need not be reached in this 
case because plaintiffs' cause of action arose in 1983, four 
years prior to the enactment of § 63-30-2(4)(a) in 1987. 
Accordingly, Standiford and its progeny apply to this case. 
3. The faulty analysis advanced by the majority and the 
parties may be due in part to this Court's decision in 
Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad, 469 P.2d 5, 6-7 (Utah 
1970), which held that the Public Service Commission's 
decision on what type of warning device to install at a 
railroad crossing is a discretionary function for which 
immunity had not been waived. However, Velasquez did not 
address whether the activity was a governmental function, 
perhaps because Velasquez was decided before Standiford. 
(Continued on page 10.) 
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erroneous assumption that UDOT's duty in this case is a 
governmental function does not excuse this Court from 
employing the proper legal analysis. 
Applying that analysis clearly shows that UDOT is 
not immune from suit, because the activity at issue is not 
the exercise of a governmental function. In Standiford v. 
Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980), this 
Court defined a governmental function as an activity which is 
"of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of 
governmental activity." In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981), we elaborated on this 
definition: "The first part of the Standiford test—activity 
of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency—does not refer to what government may 
do, but to what government alone must do." (Emphasis in 
original.) Thus, the initial issue to be answered in this 
case is whether the evaluation, installation, maintenance, 
and improvement of safety signals or devices at railroad 
crossings is so unique that it is something government alone 
must do. 
Previously, we have applied the Standiford test to 
hold that the following activities are not governmental 
functions: the operation of a golf course, Standiford, 605 
P.2d at 1237; the maintenance of a sewage system, Thomas v. 
Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 1982); the 
supervision of the disbursement of escrow funds, Cox v. Utah 
Mortgage and Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986); and 
the maintenance of a water storage tank, Bennett v. Bow 
Valley Development Corp.. 797 P.2d 419, 422 (Utah 1990). In 
contrast, we have applied Standiford to hold that the 
following activities are governmental functions: supervision 
of a financial institution, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 
631 (Utah 1983); review and approval of a land developer's 
plat, Loveland v. Orem Citv Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 775-76 (Utah 
1987); licensing of motor vehicles and maintenance of public 
records of title and ownership, Metropolitan Finance Co. v. 
State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); and 
maintenance and repair of traffic signs on streets, Richards 
v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 279 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
In the instant case, UDOT has the statutory duty to 
••provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and 
improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals 
or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads 
over the tracks of any railroad or street railroad 
(Footnote 3 continued.) 
Clearly, under post-Standiford cases, Velasquez did not employ 
the correct legal analysis. 
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corporation in the state." Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 
(Supp. 1983). Statutory authority alone, however, does not 
make an activity a governmental function for purposes of 
immunity. We noted in Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 
737, 739 (Utah 1982), that even though the Legislature may 
establish an activity as a governmental function for purposes 
of the agency's authority to operate, "it does not follow 
from this that the function automatically qualifies for 
governmental immunity as 'essential to the core of 
governmental activity.'" Nor does it follow that statutory 
authority makes an activity one that government alone must 
perform. 
In fact, both the State and the railroads have 
historically participated in installing and maintaining 
warning devices at crossings. Union Pacific acknowledged 
this fact to the trial court in its reply memorandum for 
summary judgment, stating, "[T]he Railroad has always 
•participated in' and cooperated with UDOT in 'implementing 
changes and improvements to railroad crossings' in the 
past." Indeed, nearly 100 years ago, this Court expressly 
recognized the duty of both the State and the railroad to 
provide adequate warning devices at dangerous crossings: 
[I]t is clear that, while the statutes of 
Utah make some provision for the safety of 
the public while crossing tracks when 
crossing over the public thoroughfares in 
thickly-settled communities or cities, yet 
these statutes will not relieve the 
railroad company from adopting such other 
reasonable measures for the public safety 
as common prudence may dictate, 
considering the danger, locality, travel, 
and surrounding circumstances of the 
case. The reason of such rule is founded 
in the common law that every one must so 
conduct himself and use his own property 
as that, under ordinary circumstances, he 
will not injure another in any way, if 
such injury can reasonably be avoided by 
the use of reasonable care. . . . In the 
crossing of this particular street, where 
the travel is shown to be great, and the 
danger in crossing to be greater, we are 
of the opinion that reasonable care and 
prudence would require that a flagman be 
kept constantly at the crossing during the 
time that trains continue to cross over 
it, or that gates should be erected and 
controlled so as to lessen the danger of 
injury to passengers and travelers, and 
thus lessen the danger caused by the 
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almost constant use of the tracks by the 
defendants and their trains. 
English v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 P. 47, 50 (Utah 1896). 
Similarly, in Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad, 488 P.2d 
738, 739 (Utah 1971), we acknowledged a railroad's common law 
duty to warn the public of dangerous crossings. Because a 
railroad, at least until now, has been held to a duty to 
install adequate warning devices at dangerous crossings, it 
is hardly realistic to argue that that activity is a function 
the State alone must do. The railroad's common law duty in 
itself is sufficient to make the placement of adequate 
warning devices a nongovernmental function. 
This proposition is supported by previous decisions 
in which we have held that activities capable of being 
performed by nongovernmental entities or individuals are not 
governmental functions. In Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982), for example, we held that maintenance 
of a sewage system is not a governmental function because it 
is not mandatory that a governmental entity collect and 
dispose of sewage: 
In many rural and recreational areas in our 
state, individual homeowners or small 
clusters of homes legally provide their own 
sewer services with septic tanks. Large 
developments having common ownership, such 
as condominiums or trailer courts, 
currently can and do provide their own 
collection and disposal of sewage, subject 
to government standards for pollution 
control and public health. 
Id. at 739. For the same reason, in Bennett v. Bow Valley 
Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990), we held that the 
operation of a water system was not a governmental function. 
We reasoned, "In many areas of our state, residents maintain 
wells and provide their own water. Also there are privately 
owned companies supplying water to residents." Id. at 422. 
The instant case is closely analogous to the 
activities at issue in Thomas and Bennett because, even 
though government can install safety devices at railroad 
crossings, the railroad can and has installed and maintained 
such devices. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-15.1 and 
54-4-15.3 (Supp. 1983) clearly allow UDOT to delegate this 
function to the railroad, again indicating that this is an 
activity a nongovernmental entity can perform. 
Since this activity is delegable and can be 
performed by an entity other than government, it cannot be a 
governmental function under Standiford and Johnson. I would 
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hold, therefore, that UDOT is not immune from suit in this 
case. 
Nevertheless, even assuming the activity in this 
case is a governmental function, the activity is not, as the 
majority maintains, a discretionary function for which 
immunity has been waived. A decision whether to require an 
upgrading of warning signals at a crossing arguably 
constitutes a discretionary function; however, plaintiffs' 
complaint against UDOT is not that UDOT made the wrong 
decision, but rather, that UDOT failed to implement the 
decision to upgrade the warning devices at the Droubay 
crossing. Policy decisions are generally considered to be 
discretionary functions for which immunity has not been 
waived. However, this Court has observed mq.re than once that 
the implementation of a policy decision is an operational, 
not a discretionary, act and, as such, is undeserving of the 
discretionary function protection. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Arauelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1985) (duty to implement 
policy decision on whether and how to release juvenile 
delinquent); Little v. Utah State Division of Family Servs., 
667 P.2d 49, 51-52 (Utah 1983) (failure to properly evaluate 
foster home, supervise placement of infant, and protect 
infant from harm is a breach of conduct implemental in 
nature); Biaelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980) 
(design of traffic control system does not involve the "basic 
policy making level"); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519-20 
(Utah 1980) (one-on-one dealings between physician and 
patient take place at the implementing/operational level, not 
at the policy-making level). In Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 
279 (Utah 1985), a probation officer decided to release 
Arguelles, a juvenile offender with a history of sexual 
violence toward children, into the community. The officer 
conditioned release on Arguelles' attending weekly therapy 
sessions, with a professional counsellor. Arguelles attended 
only four therapy sessions and three months after his 
release, sodomized and stabbed a fourteen-year-old girl. We 
noted that the State would be immune from suit for the 
probation officer's decision to release the juvenile into the 
community because that decision is a discretionary function. 
Id. at 282. However, we held that the discretionary function 
protection did not extend to the officer's failure to monitor 
Arguelles' treatment after release because "[a] decision or 
action implementing a preexisting policy is operational in 
nature and is undeserving of protection under the 
discretionary function exception." Id. at 283. 
In this case, UDOT decided to upgrade the warning 
signals at the Droubay crossing prior to the decedents' 
accident. UDOT's failure to implement that decision goes 
beyond the status of a discretionary function deserving of 
protection under § 63-30-10(1)(a). 
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UDOT defends its failure to implement its decision 
on the basis of limited federal funding. It argues that the 
decision to delay implementation necessarily involved 
discretionary decisions regarding the allocation of limited 
resources. This assertion, which the majority facilely 
accepts, hides a fundamental fact. This case involves much 
more than the allocation of limited resources: UDOT has 
other courses of action open to it that do not involve 
reliance on federal funding for warning devices. 
A review of Title 54 of the Utah Code establishes 
that UDOT has a duty to the public to promote public safety 
at railroad crossings and that UDOT may delegate that 
responsibility to the railroad. Section 54-4-15.1 imposes a 
duty on UDOT, "so as to promote the public safety . . . [to] 
provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and 
improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals 
or devices at grade crossings on public highways . . . ." 
However, under section 54-4-15.3, UDOT "shall apportion the 
cost of the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or 
improvement of any signals or devices described in section 
54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street railroad and the 
public agency involved." Under this statutory scheme, 
therefore, UDOT, in carrying out its obligation to promote 
public safety at railroad crossings, clearly could have 
required Union Pacific to pay for and install upgraded 
signals at the Droubay crossing. In fact, according to Union 
Pacific's own statements to the trial court, UDOT has already 
delegated the responsibility and expense of maintaining 
safety devices exclusively to the railroad. 
Since UDOT could have delegated the installation and 
expense of warning signals to Union Pacific, UDOT should not 
now be able to raise limited resources and lack of funding as 
a defense. Such a defense would be clearly unacceptable in 
cases where government has a nondelegable duty, such as 
repairing sidewalks, Murray v. Qqden City, 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1976), or maintaining streets, Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 
P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982). If lack of funding should not 
excuse governmental action in nondelegable duty cases, it 
certainly should not excuse governmental action when the duty 
is delegable. 
Under the circumstances, a jury could very well find 
that UDOT breached its duty to implement the decision to 
install warning devices at the Droubay crossing, not because 
it failed to allocate funding, but because it did not require 
installation of the devices by Union Pacific. I would 
therefore remand this case for a trial on whether UDOT was 
negligent. 
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II 
I turn next to whether the railroad has a duty to 
upgrade warning devices at the Droubay crossing. 
Contravening nearly 100 years of case law, the majority 
essentially holds that UDOT's statutory responsibility to 
determine the appropriate warnings to be installed at 
crossings absolves Union Pacific's common law duty to install 
warning signals at overly hazardous crossings. The majority 
bases its holding on the assumption that UDOT's authority in 
this area is exclusive. As noted above, that premise is 
incorrect.4 
The majority observes: 
[T]he trial court found that the crossing 
was not "more than ordinarily hazardous" 
because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, 
or even suggest, what more Union Pacific 
could have done to make this crossing 
safer, short of installing automatic 
warning lights and signs and gates, which 
admittedly was not its responsibility. 
As I have already shown, this Court has traditionally imposed 
a common law duty on the railroad to exercise reasonable and 
due care, including providing safety devices or flagmen and 
sounding bells and whistles at more-than-ordinarily-hazardous 
crossings, despite UDOT's statutory authority. See English 
v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 P. 47, 50 (Utah 1896); Bridges v. 
Union Pacific R.R., 488 P.2d 738, 739 (Utah 1971); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (Supp. 1983) (locomotives must be 
equipped with bells or whistles and must sound them within 
eighty rods of each crossing). In fact, Bridges held that a 
jury could find a railroad negligent for not taking 
additional precautions, such as installing adequate signaling 
devices, if the crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous as 
a result. Bridges. 488 P.2d at 739. Other jurisdictions 
have also placed this duty on railroads. See, e.g. . 
Stromquist v. Burlington Northern, Inc.. 444 N.E.2d 1113, 
4. Section 54-4-15(2) originally stated, "The [Public 
Service] [C]ommission shall have the exclusive power to 
determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular 
point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, 
maintenance, use and protection . . . of each crossing of a 
public road or highway by a railroad . . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-4-15(2) (1953) (emphasis added). However, in 1975, the 
Legislature deleted the term "exclusive" and changed 
"commission" to UDOT. The section now begins, "The department 
shall have the power to determine and prescribe . . . ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2) (Supp. 1983). 
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1116 (111. Ct. App. 1983) (w [Irrespective of orders or 
proceedings of Illinois Commerce Commission, a railroad has 
common law duty to provide adequate warning devices at its 
railroad crossings."); Central Indiana Ry. v. Anderson 
Banking Co, , 247 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. 1969) (better rule is 
majority rule which allows jury to determine whether crossing 
was extra hazardous such that railroad has duty to warn 
traveling public); Stevens v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 357 
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (if, under all circum-
stances, grade crossing is extra hazardous, railroad can be 
found negligent for its failure to adequately protect the 
public from danger by providing warnings and taking safety 
precautions in addition to those required by statute). 
The majority inexplicably abrogates this 
long-standing and well-recognized duty, stating only that 
UDOT's statutory authority to determine which crossings 
should have automatic warning lights and gates absolves Union 
Pacific of any duty. The fact that one party has a duty, 
however, does not preclude another party from having a 
concurrent duty. I would hold that Union Pacific has a duty 
to upgrade warning signals at overly hazardous crossings. 
Ill 
Since I would hold that both UDOT and Union Pacific 
have a duty to install warning devices at overly hazardous 
crossings, the final issue to be resolved is whether 
plaintiffs raised an issue of material fact regarding whether 
the Droubay crossing was overly hazardous. I believe that 
plaintiffs have done so. English set forth several 
possibilities for more-than-ordinarily-hazardous crossings: 
that [the crossing] is in a 
thickly-populated portion of-the town or 
city; or that the view of the track is 
obstructed, either by way of the company 
itself or by other objects proper in 
themselves, or that the crossing is a 
much-traveled one, and the noise of 
approaching trains is rendered indistinct, 
and the ordinary signals difficult to be 
heard, by reason of bustle and confusion 
incident to railway or other business; or 
by reason of some other such like cause 
English, 45 P. at 50. Bridges further outlined the standard: 
To authorize a jury to find negligence 
on the part of the railroad in not taking 
additional precautions, there must be 
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evidence to indicate that the crossing was 
more than ordinarily hazardous, i. e., 
there must be something in the 
configuration of the land, or in the 
construction of the railroad, or in the 
structures in the vicinity, or in the 
nature or amount of the travel on the 
highway, or in other conditions, which 
renders the warning employed at the 
crossing inadequate to warn the public of 
danger. 
Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739 (citing Gant v. Chicago & N.W. Rv., 
434 F.2d 1255, 1258 (8th Cir. 1970); English v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 45 P. 47 (1896)). 
In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that the 
crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous because the angle 
at which the tracks cross Droubay Road makes it difficult for 
a driver to judge the distance and speed at which a train is 
approaching the crossing. The majority, the Court of 
Appeals, and the trial court all ignored this allegation 
because plaintiffs' expert affidavit was apparently based in 
part on faulty information. The record, however, contains 
additional evidence supporting plaintiffs' allegation. For 
example, the accident report of the investigating officer 
states that he went to the accident scene on April 14, 1983, 
at 1 a.m. and made the following observations: 
At night it is harder to estimate speeds. 
Parking my vehicle in the travel lane going 
North @100 feet from the tracks, I 
estimated the speed of the train. At that 
angle to the train, it was very difficult 
to judge the speed of the train. I 
estimated the speed of the train @45 mph 
and felt sure I had time to cross the 
intersection. On radar stationary, the 
train was traveling at 70 mph, I would not 
have made it through the intersection if I 
had tried. 
The record also contains evidence that trains often crossed 
at speeds of 70 mph and that four school buses and 580 cars 
travelled the crossing every day. Furthermore, the record 
clearly shows that prior to the accident, UDOT had determined 
that the crossing was sufficiently dangerous to warrant 
automatic warning signals and gates, which is strong evidence 
that the Droubay crossing is overly hazardous. In sum, these 
are all facts which a jury would consider in determining 
whether this crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous. 
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We have often held that negligence or the lack of 
negligence should not be decided on summary judgment except 
in the most clear-cut cases. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 
1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). In the instant case, the 
record demonstrates that an issue of fact exists regarding 
the hazardousness of the Droubay crossing. Therefore, I 
believe plaintiffs should be able to present their case to a 
jury. 
IV 
In conclusion, I believe the majority opinion 
incorrectly analyzes this case and grossly misapplies or 
ignores our previous decisions. The result unjustly denies 
recovery to the plaintiffs in this case and to all future 
plaintiffs who find themselves similarly situated. I 
therefore cannot join the majority and believe that this case 
should be remanded for a trial. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Stewart. 
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I CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I DISSENT: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Although the parties refer to section 38-1-11 as 
a statute of limitation, section 38-1-11 is not, 
strictly speaking, a statute of limitation. See Proj-
ects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan 
Co., 798 P.2d 738,751 n.13 (Utah 1990). 
2. More recently, in Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990), this court 
addressed whether plaintiffs action to foreclose his 
mechanic's lien was timely under section 38-1-11. 
Because the action was not filed within twelve 
months of the completion of the contract between 
the owner and plaintiff, the court held that the lien 
was not timely filed. Id. at 173. The court took 
pains to note that plaintiff, a painting contractor, 
entered into a contract directly with the owner and 
was "not a subcontractor as is often the situation 
where painting work is performed." Id. at 172 n. 11. 
3. This interpretation is consistent with Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-7(1) (Supp. 1991), concerning when a 
claimant's Hen must be recorded, which speaks not 
in terms of when the particular claimant's work is 
finished but rather provides that any lien must be 
recorded "within 80 days after substantial comple-
tion of the project or improvement ...." It would be 
anomalous to track the timeliness of recordation of 
a subcontractor's lien from completion of the 
project, while calculating his year in which to bring 
his action from the completion of his own subcon-
tract. Indeed, under such a view, it might happen 
that the one-year period in which a subcontractor 
would be required to bring his action would expire 
before the start of the 80-day period in which the 
subcontractor would be entitled to record his lien. 
4/Not only does this result serve the statutory pre-
ference recognized in note 5, infra, it also permits a 
subcontractor, without jeopardizing his lien rights, 
to take a "wait and see" attitude. Nor does it 
disrupt certain contractual arrangements. 
On major projects of long duration, a subcontr-
actor who completes his work early, such as an 
excavator, need not file his action within twelve 
months after the excavation work was done, at 
which time interior plumbing or other work may 
still be in process. He can honor the general contr-
actor's plea to wait just a little longer for payment, 
pending an anticipated construction loan disburse-
ment or additional money brought in by a new 
investor, without foregoing the right to enforce his 
lien in due course if he remains unpaid. Similarly, a 
subcontractor who, by the terms of his subcontract, 
is not entitled to his final payment until the general 
contractor receives his final payment, is not required 
to needlessly sue on his lien in situations where there 
is more than a year between completion of the 
subcontract work and the general contractor's final 
payment. 
5. Neither party has suggested that LSI's motion to 
intervene in the existing lien action should be treated 
differently than a complaint to commence its own 
action. Notwithstanding Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which defines an action as being 
commenced by filing a complaint, it seems sensible 
for the instant purpose to treat LSI's motion for 
intervention as equivalent to the commencement of 
its own action, given the preference of the mecha-
nics' lien statute for a single lien proceeding rather 
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than a multitude of actions. See Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-8,-13,-14(1988). 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiff Nicholas Lamarr (Lamarr) appeals 
from a summary judgment dismissing his 
negligence claims against the Utah State 
Department of Transportation (UDOT) and 
Salt Lake City (the City) arising out of an 
accident on the North Temple overpass. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
On April 18, 1987, at approximately 10:30 
p.m., Lamarr was struck by a car while 
walking east across the North Temple over-
pass. The impact threw Lamarr over the side 
of the overpass, and Lamarr struck the 
ground, suffering serious, permanent injuries. 
Before the accident, Lamarr had walked 
west across the overpass using the pedestrian 
walkway that deposits pedestrians under the 
overpass. Lamarr was frightened and harassed 
by transients who had congregated under the 
overpass. On his return trip, Lamarr walked 
along the overpass* roadway. Lamarr claims 
this was necessary to avoid harassment and 
possible physical violence by the transients 
congregated around the stairway leading to the 
walkway. While walking along the roadway, 
an automobile struck Lamarr throwing him 
over the side of the overpass. 
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Lamarr brought suit against UDOT and the 
City. Lamarr contends UDOT and the City 
were negligent in failing to properly construct, 
maintain, and place signs on the overpass. 
Lamarr also contends the City negligently 
failed to properly "control"1 the transient 
population under the overpass". After disco-
very, the City and UDOT moved for summary 
judgment on a number of alternative grounds. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of both UDOT and the City. 
Lamarr presents four issues on appeal: (1) 
did the trial court err in holding the City owed 
Lamarr no duty for construction, mainten-
ance, or placing signs on the overpass?; (2) did 
the trial court err in holding the City owed 
Lamarr no private duty to control the trans-
ient population?; (3) did the trial court err in 
ruling as a matter of law the City and UDOT 
did not proximately cause Lamarr's injuries?; 
and (4) did the trial court err in concluding 
any duty of the City to control the transient 
population is an immune discretionary func-
tion, under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
10(l)(a) (1989)? UDOT presents two additional 
issues on appeal: (1) did Lamarr's failure to 
file a notice of his claim with both UDOT and 
the attorney general deprive the trial court of 
jurisdiction over Lamarr's claims against 
UDOT?, and (2) did UDOT owe Lamarr a 
duty of care? 
Summary judgment is proper when the 
record indicates that "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 
460 (Utah App. 1991). We review the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment under a 
"correctness" standard. Id. Thus, we accord 
no deference to the trial court's legal conclu-
sions underlying its grant of summary judg-
ment. Id. 
We first consider whether summary judg-
ment in favor of the City was proper, and 
then turn to the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of UDOT. 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE CITY 
Lamarr raises multiple claims of error. 
Because of our resolution of the duty issue, 
however, we need not reach the other issues 
briefed on appeal.2 
A. Duty Generally 
In Utah, a plaintiff must establish four 
elements to state a claim of negligence: the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, defendant 
breached the duty (negligence), the breach of 
the duty was the proximate cause of plaintiffs 
injury, and there was in fact injury. Reeves v. 
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991). Est-
ablishing the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty of care is "[a]n essential element of a 
negligence claim." Owens v. Garfield, 784 
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). In fact, the Utah 
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Supreme Court recently noted that without a 
showing of duty, a plaintiff cannot recover. 
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 
1991). "Duty is 'a question of whether the 
defendant is under any obligation for the 
benefit of a particular plaintiff .... ," Ferree v. 
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)(quoting 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on 
the Law of Torts §30, at 356-57 (W. Keeton 
5th ed. 1984)). Whether the defendant owed 
the plaintiff a duty of care is "entirely a que-
stion of law to be determined by the court." Id. 
B. Duty to Maintain Safe Overpass 
Lamarr first claims the City owed him a 
duty to maintain a sidewalk on the overpass or 
to place on the overpass signs that would have 
prevented him from walking on the roadway. 
Lamarr contends this duty inheres from the 
Utah Sidewalk Construction Act, which pro-
vides: 
The legislature recognizes that 
adequate sidewalks and pedestrian 
safety devices are essential to the 
general welfare of the citizens of the 
state. It is the opinion of the legis-
lature that existing sidewalks within 
the state, especially in the most 
populated areas, are not adequate 
to service the walking public with a 
result of creating unnecessary 
hazards to pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic. 
Utah Code Ann. §27-14-2 (1989). Section 
27-14-2 further states: "It is the intent of 
this act to provide a means whereby a portion 
of the funds received by the counties and 
participating cities as B and C road funds may 
be used for the construction of curbs, gutters, 
sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices purs-
uant to the guidelines set forth in this act." Id. 
(emphasis added). Lamarr argues this statute 
imposes a mandatory duty on the City to 
construct a sidewalk on the overpass, even 
though Lamarr admits the overpass is a state 
road and already has a state-maintained 
pedestrian walkway. We disagree. 
In construing statutes, we are bound to 
"assume that each term of a statute was used 
advisedly; and that each should be given an 
interpretation and application in accord with 
their [sic] usually accepted meaning, unless the 
context otherwise requires." Grant v. Utah 
State Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 
1035, 1036 (Utah 1971). In Grant, the court 
construed a forfeiture statute providing that 
the State Land Board "'may reinstate'" a 
previously forfeited land sales contract. Id., 
485 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 
65-1-47 (1953)). The plaintiff contended 
section 65-1-47 "vest[ed] in him the abso-
lute right to reinstate a forfeited certificate." Id. 
The court disagreed, holding the word 
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"may" is not mandatory but only permissive. 
Id. 
Based on the plain meaning of the statute, 
we hold the Utah Sidewalk Construction Act 
does not place a mandatory duty on the City 
to supplement the State's efforts to ensure 
pedestrian safety on state roads. Thus, the 
City had no duty to maintain or construct a 
sidewalk on the overpass or to place signs on 
the overpass that would have prevented 
Lamarr from walking across the roadway. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
granting the City summary judgment on this 
duty issue.3 
C. Public Duty Doctrine 
Lamarr also claims the City owed him a 
duty to "control" the transient population 
beneath the overpass. The trial court held the 
City did not owe Lamarr such a duty. We 
agree with the trial court, and hold that under 
the public duty doctrine, the City owed no 
duty to Lamarr to "control" transients. 
Under the public duty doctrine, 
[f]or a governmental agency and 
its agents to be liable for negligently 
caused injury suffered by a member 
of the public, the plaintiff must 
show a breach of a duty owed him 
as an individual, not merely the 
breach of an obligation owed to the 
general public at large by the gov-
ernmental official. 
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (citing Obray v. Mal-
mberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 
(1971)). The public duty doctrine has been 
defined as "a duty to all is a duty to none." 
Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1165 (Durham, J., conc-
urring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, if 
the City owed no duty to Lamarr apart from 
its duty to the general public, Lamarr cannot 
recover. See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained 
the parameters of Utah's public duty doctrine. 
See id. In Ferree, the court applied the public 
duty doctrine holding state corrections offic-
ials were not liable when a prison inmate on 
weekend release murdered Dean Ferree. Id. at 
151-52. The court concluded the officials had 
only a general duty to the public, not a private 
duty to Ferree, and therefore owed Ferree no 
duty of care. Id. Moreover, in Rollins, 813 
P.2d 1156, the court affirmed the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment because under the 
public duty doctrine, the State did not owe a 
duty to protect the decedent from a state 
hospital patient. Id. at 1161-62. The court 
specifically noted the decedent "was simply a 
member of the public, no more distinguishable 
to the hospital than to any other person." Id. 
at 1162. 
Lamarr contends "[t]he public duty doctrine 
has no application where governmental imm-
unity has specifically been waived by statute." 
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The Utah Supreme Court has clearly rejected 
Lamarr's theory.4 The specific question of the 
effect of waiver of immunity on the public 
duty doctrine was addressed in Ferree. In 
rejecting a claim similar to Lamarr's, the 
court stated: 
Sovereign immunity, however, is an 
affirmative defense and conceptu-
ally arises subsequent to the ques-
tion of whether there is tort liability 
in the first instance. There is sound 
reason and desirable simplicity in 
analyzing and applying negligence 
concepts before deciding issues of 
sovereign immunity.... 
"... Conceptually, the question of 
the applicability of a statutory 
immunity does not even arise until 
it is determined that a defendant 
otherwise owes a duty of care to the 
plaintiff and thus would be liable in 
the absence of such immunity." 
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53 (quoting Davi-
dson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 
201-02, 649 P.2d 894, 896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 
252,254(1982)). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently affirmed 
its decision and reasoning in Ferree. In Rollins, 
813 P.2d 1556, the estate of a decedent killed 
in an accident with a stolen automobile driven 
by a state hospital patient brought a wrongful 
death action against, among others, the State. 
Id. at 1158. The trial court granted the State's 
motion for summary judgment concluding the 
State had no duty to the decedent other than 
its duty to the general public. Id. On appeal, 
the court again addressed the question of 
whether the legislature's abrogation of imm-
unity abolished the public duty doctrine. Once 
again answering this question in the negative, 
the court explained: 
[T]he legislature's abrogation of 
absolute sovereign immunity does 
not lead to the conclusion that the 
public duty doctrine has also been 
abrogated. Legislative recognition 
of a right to recover from one who 
has previously been immune from 
liability for tortious acts cannot 
logically be read as an elimination 
of the requirement that before one 
can recover damages from another, 
a tort must be proven. There must 
still be proof of a duty owed to the 
one claiming injury and a breach of 
that duty. 
Therefore, in the present case, as 
in any tort case, the proper mode of 
analysis is to first consider whether 
there is a legal theory upon which 
suit can be brought ... before con-
sidering the separate and indepen-
dent question of whether the 
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[governmental agency] is immune. 
Id. at 1162 n.3 (emphasis added); see also Kirk 
v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah App. 
1989)(to reach immunity issue, court must 
assume duty and negligence). 
Based on the preceding authority, Lamarr 
must establish the City owed him a "special 
duty." See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151. We conc-
lude Lamarr has failed to establish the City 
owed him any duty of care beyond that owed 
the general public. There is no evidence in the 
record the City had any reason to distinguish 
Lamarr from the general public. Like the 
decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set 
himself apart" from the general public such 
that any special duty arose between himself 
and the City. In fact, there is no evidence the 
City had any knowledge whatsoever of either 
of Lamarr's trips across the overpass.5 
In summary, we hold the City owed Lamarr 
no duty of care. Accordingly, the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of the City. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR UDOT 
UDOT moved for summary judgment on 
grounds Lamarr failed to file notice of his 
claim within one year with both UDOT and 
the Utah Attorney General as required by the 
waiver provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-3-12 
(1989). Although the issue was fully briefed, 
the trial court did not reach the notice issue. 
Rather, the trial court ruled in favor of UDOT 
on its proximate cause claim. On appeal, 
UDOT asserts these alternative grounds upon 
which we can affirm the trial court's summary 
judgment: absence of proper notice, proximate 
cause, or duty of care owed to Lamarr. 
Because of our resolution of the threshold 
notice issue, we do not reach the proximate 
cause and duty issues. 
A. Notice of Claim is Jurisdictional 
Lamarr first claims the notice issue is not 
properly before this court. Lamarr asserts the 
notice issue is an affirmative defense that was 
not pleaded in the answer, and thus Rule 8(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precludes 
UDOT from raising it in its summary judg-
ment motion and on appeal. Lamarr notes 
UDOT never mentions the term "notice of 
claim" in its answer. He further argues UDOT 
did not request the court to rule on this issue 
on summary judgment and therefore we 
cannot consider it on appeal. Lamarr's argu-
ment, however, misconstrues the nature of the 
statutory notice of claim requirement. Lamarr 
erroneously asserts the notice of claim provi-
sion is a statute of limitation. Rather, the 
supreme court has held the statutory notice 
requirement is a jurisdictional requirement and 
a precondition to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988). 
Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any 
time by any party or the court. Olson v. Salt 
Lake City Sen. Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 
1986). Therefore, Lamarr's contention that 
the notice issue is not properly before this 
court fails. In fact, Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires this court to 
dismiss the claim against UDOT if the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction. 
B. Notice of Claim Under Section 63-30-12 
First, Lamarr claims Rule 4(e)(ll) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows him to 
effect notice by serving only UDOT, and not 
the attorney general. Section 63-30-12, 
however, is more specific than Rule 4 in that 
the former requires notice on UDOT and the 
attorney general. When two statutory provis-
ions appear to conflict, the more specific 
provision governs over the more general pro-
vision. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 
681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984). Thus, section 
63-30-12 is the applicable rule at issue, not 
Rule 4. To invoke the trial court's jurisdiction 
over UDOT, Lamarr was required to comply 
with section 63-30-12, the more specific 
jurisdictional rule. 
Next, Lamarr argues he has "effectively" 
complied with section 63-3-12 by serving 
notice only on UDOT. Lamarr points out the 
attorney general's office had actual notice of 
Lamarr's claims within the one-year period. 
Thus, Lamarr argues the intent of the statute 
was satisfied. 
In construing section 60-30-12, the 
supreme court has stated: "Section 63-30-12 
provides that an action against the State is 
barred if the required notice is not filed. It 
therefore makes failure to give notice grounds 
for dismissal. A plain reading of those sections 
indicates that no suit against the State may be 
maintained if notice is not given." Madsen, 
769 P.2d at 249 (citation omitted)(emphasis 
added). The importance of Madsen for 
Lamarr's case is the supreme court's applic-
ation of "[a] plain reading" of section 60-30-
12. Id. The plain language of section 60-30-
12 requires notice both to the attorney general 
and UDOT, and Lamarr admits he never filed 
notice with the attorney general.6 
Moreover, the supreme court has indicated 
that actual notice cannot cure a failure to 
comply with the notice provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. In Varoz v. 
Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1973), the court held a plaintiff's minority did 
not excuse failure to comply with a statute 
requiring timely notice of a claim against a 
county. Id., 506 P.2d at 436.7 Significantly for 
the present case, the supreme court held that 
the county's actual notice of the claim did not 
satisfy the statute: 
[f]rom the language of the statute it 
is quite clear that the legislature 
intended to make the filing of a 
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timely notice of claim prerequisite 
to maintaining an action. 
Actual knowledge of the circu-
mstances which resulted in the 
death of the plaintiffs mother by 
officials of the county does not 
dispense with the necessity of filing 
a timely claim. 
Requiring written notice to both UDOT and 
the attorney general is consistent with cases 
interpreting notice statutes similar to section 
60-30-12. For example, Scarborough v. 
Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1975), involved a companion statute to section 
63-30-12, section 63-30-13. Section 63-
30-13 is identical to section 63-30-12 
except that the former applies to political 
subdivisions, whereas the latter applies to state 
agencies. In Scarborough, the trial court dis-
missed a complaint against Granite School 
District because the plaintiff had not filed 
notice with the school district and the attorney 
general. Id. at 481. The supreme court, affir-
ming the dismissal, explained: 
The School District is a political 
subdivision of the state. Therefore 
it would normally be immune from 
suit; and the right to sue is an exc-
eption created by statute. We have 
consistently held that where a cause 
of action is based upon a statute, 
full compliance with its requirem-
ents is a condition precedent to the 
right to maintain a suit. 
Id. at 482 (footnotes omitted). 
Applying a plain reading, we hold section 63-
30-12 required Lamarr to serve written notice 
of his claim on both UDOT and the attorney 
general within one year of his injuries. Lamarr 
failed to serve the attorney general within the 
specified time, thus depriving the trial court of 
jurisdiction over Lamarr's claims against 
UDOT. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's dismissal of Lamarr's claims against 
UDOT. 
III. CONCLUSION 
We hold the trial court did not err in con-
cluding as a matter of law that the City owed 
Lamarr no duty of care. Further, we hold 
Lamarr's failure to comply with the notice 
provision of the Governmental Immunity Act 
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over 
Lamarr's claims against UDOT. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, the 
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding 
Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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1. Although we find Lamarr's use of the term 
"control" in reference to the City's transient popu-
lation troublesome, to directly address Lamarr's 
claims we repeat that term here. 
2. Lamarr also argues the trial court improperly 
reconsidered the question of the City's duty to 
Lamarr. Lamarr correctly notes the trial court 
denied the City's first motion for summary judg-
ment asserting the City owed Lamarr no duty of 
care. The trial court granted summary judgment 
only after the City made a second motion for 
summary judgment. Lamarr claims the trial court's 
earlier denial of the City's first motion for summary 
judgment precluded the trial court from revisiting 
the duty issue. 
Lamarr ignores the well-established rule that 
"'[a]ny judge is free to change his or her mind on 
the outcome of a case until a decision is formally 
rendered.'" Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr-
uctors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App. 
1988)(quoting Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 
760 (Utah 1985)). "[A] trial court is not inexorably 
bound by its own precedents ...." Id. The trial court 
is free to reconsider its earlier decision, especially 
when, as here, a party supports a second motion for 
summary judgment with additional evidence. This 
rule has particular application in cases that, like this 
one, involve multiple parties and multiple claims. Id. 
at 44 n.5. Therefore, we conclude the trial court 
did not err in considering the City's second motion 
for summary judgment. 
3. We emphasize our resolution of the duty issue is 
fact specific. There is no dispute the overpass is a 
state highway. Thus, any duty of the City to main-
tain that highway must be a statutory duty, and our 
analysis focuses on that issue. Our resolution of this 
issue in no way addresses the existence or scope of 
the City's duty to safely maintain its streets. 
Because we hold the City had no duty to const-
ruct or place signs on the overpass, we need not 
reach the issue of whether that duty is a public or 
private duty under the public duty doctrine. 
4. The public duty doctrine is a creature of the 
common law. Lamarr basically argues the legislature 
abrogated the common law doctrine in enacting the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Although the supreme 
court in Ferree and Rollins expressly rejects this 
argument, we note the legislature could abrogate 
that common law doctrine if it chose to do so in 
specific terms. Cf. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 
8, 12 (Utah 1991)(legislature has last word with 
respect to tort law). 
5. This conclusion is also supported by the supreme 
court's decision in Little v. Utah State Division of 
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). In that 
case, the court held that once a State agency took 
custody of an autistic child and placed the child in a 
foster home, the agency assumed a duty of due care 
to the child. Id. at 51. It was only after the agency 
had knowledge of the child's condition and assumed 
custody of the child, however, that the special rela-
tionship arose between the agency and child. Id. 
6. Recently, in Kabwasa v. University of Utah, Civ. 
N o . 8 9 - C - 4 8 8 G ( D . U t a h J u n e 7 , 
1990)(Memorandum Decision and Order), Judge 
Green of the United States Court for the District of 
Utah interpreted section 63-30-12 to require 
notice to both the attorney general and the agency. 
A party brought several claims, including state law 
claims, against the University of Utah. That party, 
however, failed to comply with section 63-30-12 
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and gave notice only to the attorney general and not 
to the University of Utah. The University of Utah 
claimed the party's failure to comply with section 
63-30-12 by giving both the University and atto-
rney general notice deprived the court of jurisdic-
tion. Judge Green ruled: 
The court agrees with the defendants 
that the plain meaning of section 63-30-
12 requires that two notices of claim 
should have been filed by plaintiff: one 
to the Attorney General and one to the 
University of Utah. Although this stat-
utory requirement may result in redun-
dant notice being given, such redund-
ancy apparently is mandated by the 
statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney 
General is the agent and legal counsel 
for all state agencies, including the 
University of Utah. In this pendant state 
law claim, the court is unwilling to 
ignore the unambiguous language of the 
Utah statute requiring two separate 
notices, especially where the Utah 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
strict compliance with the notice of 
claim provision is essential to maintain a 
suit pursuant to the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Jd. at 5. 
7. We note Varoz was impliedly overruled by the 
enactment of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-36 
(1992)(enacted in 1975 and amended in 1987). That 
section provides "the time of [a] disability is not a 
part of the time limited for the commencement of 
the action." Id. In Scott v. School Board of Granite 
School District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the court 
held this section applies to the notice provisions of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 748. Thus, 
the one-year period for filing notice under section 
63-30-12 is tolled for the duration of any legally 
recognized disability. Section 78-12-36, as inter-
preted by Scorr, however, provides Lamarr no 
support as he has not relied on that section and does 
not claim a disability prevented him from filing 
notice with the attorney general. 
8. See also Edwards v. Iron County ex rel. Valley 
View Medical Ctr., 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 
1975)(even if county employees had actual knowl-
edge of plaintiffs injuries, plaintiff cannot dispense 
with notice requirement); Lando v. City of Chicago* 
128 111. App. 3d 597, 470 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 
(1984)(where required notice was defective, actual 
notice supplied by third-party (paramedics) did not 
satisfy statute). 
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PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on respondent 
Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing*s motion for summary dismissal of 
the petition for judicial review. We dismiss the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
Petitioner is licensed by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing to 
administer a health facility pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §58-15-1 to-11 (1990). The 
Division is empowered to suspend, revoke or 
place on probation the license of any licensee 
who "is or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule." Utah 
Code Ann. §58-1-15 (Supp. 1991). On 
May 2, 1991, the Division filed its initial pet-
ition alleging that the petitioner engaged in 
unprofessional conduct including physically 
abusing four patients and administering con-
taminated medicines, both in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §58-15-2(a), and administering 
medication without a physician's order, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-1-
10(l)(a) (Supp. 1991). On July 22, 1991, the 
Division filed an amended petition alleging 
basically the same conduct. 
On May 14, 1991, petitioner was found by 
the Second Circuit Court to be not guilty of 
assault of one of the four patients. On May 7, 
1991, charges of "Abuse of a Disabled Adult" 
were dismissed. In two separate motions, 
petitioner moved to dismiss the Division's 
petitions on grounds that the proceeding 
constituted double jeopardy under the federal 
and state constitutions, and on a claim that 
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